Canonical ADSys Uses a Less Trusted Source
Critical severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Jun 22, 2026
to the GitHub Advisory Database
•
Updated Sep 21, 2026
Package
Affected versions
< 0.16.3-0.20250318112551-8b1939f96d38
Patched versions
0.16.3-0.20250318112551-8b1939f96d38
Description
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Jun 22, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Jun 22, 2026
Reviewed
Sep 21, 2026
Last updated
Sep 21, 2026
An issue was discovered in Canonical ADSys upstream versions through v0.16.2. During Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate auto-enrollment via the vendored Samba client script (internal/policies/certificate/python/vendor_samba/gp/gp_cert_auto_enroll_ext.py), ADSys utilizes a plaintext HTTP connection (http://) instead of a secure HTTPS connection (https://) to request the CA certificate from the Active Directory Certificate Services server (GetCACert). An unauthenticated network attacker positioned between the managed Ubuntu host and the configured AD CS CA hostname can conduct a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. By intercepting the plaintext HTTP request, the attacker can supply an arbitrary, attacker-controlled Root CA certificate. Because the system automatically accepts this certificate and registers it into the local system trust store via update-ca-certificates, this results in system-wide trust store poisoning. Consequently, TLS clients utilizing the operating system trust store on the affected machine will accept rogue certificates for arbitrary domains, enabling persistent decryption and interception of subsequent TLS connections. This issue is resolved in version v0.16.3.
References